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BARRY KELLMAN AND STEPHEN DYcus*
The twentieth century's last year was, in terms of national and international security, a
period of subtle adjustments in six primary areas driven substantially by a changing appre-
ciation of principal threats and by clashing views as to how the United States should best
protect its national security.
" In Kosovo, NATO's refusal to allow Serbia to victimize its citizens served to expand
the concept of humanitarian intervention in a sovereign state's internal affairs.
" Concerning weapons control, there were no prominent achievements and one notable
failure, but there were subtle tightenings of the web of multilateral obligations that
limit states' deployment options.
" Perhaps of greatest long-term significance, threats to security increasingly focused on
terrorism by nonstate actors.
" The national security implications of vulnerability to and exploitation of cyber warfare
moved to center stage.
" Congress and the president subtly adjusted their claims of authority over strategic
policy.
" Within the national security establishment, efforts to maintain control over informa-
tion became increasingly salient as evidence grew of breaches of confidentiality.
I. Use of Force Issues
A. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION -Kosovo'
Throughout 1998, escalating violence in Kosovo left thousands of Kosovar Albanians
dead and forced several hundred thousand more from their homes. On September 23, 1998,
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1. Background information for this section is drawn from news accounts and from a NATO historical
overview, NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo (last modified July 15, 1999) <http://www.nato.intl
kosovo/history.htm>. See also Kosovo & Yugoslavia: Law in Crisis (visited May 30, 2000) <http://www.jurist.
law.pitt.edu/kosovo.htm>.
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 11992 expressed deep concern about the excessive use of
force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army in Kosovo, and it called for a cease-
fire by all parties to the conflict. Three weeks later, following a threat of NATO air strikes,
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosovic agreed to comply with Resolution 1199 to withdraw
his forces from Kosovo and facilitate the return of the refugees. Shortly thereafter, Security
Council Resolution 1203' endorsed missions by the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) and NATO, on the ground and in the air, respectively, to verify
compliance.
Concerted diplomatic efforts in early 1999 culminated in negotiations in Rambouillet in
February and Paris in March, but those talks ended without agreement. Serbian forces then
stepped up their operations in Kosovo, moving additional troops and equipment into the
province in violation of the October agreement. On March 23, after further diplomatic
efforts failed to persuade Milosovic to pull back, NATO authorized air strikes against Ser-
bian targets throughout Yugoslavia. NATO insisted that it was not waging war against
Yugoslavia but was instead seeking to prevent more human suffering, repression, and vio-
lence against the civilian population of Kosovo and to prevent instability from spreading
in the region. 4 Operation Allied Force began the following day.
On March 26, President Clinton sent a letter to the leaders of both houses of Congress
reporting U.S. involvement in the NATO air strikes, "consistent with the War Powers
Resolution."' Three weeks later, on April 13, the president signed Executive Order 13,119,
designating the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its airspace, and adjacent waters as a combat
zone effective March 24.6 But he made no report to Congress under section 4(a)(1) of the
War Powers Resolution that U.S. armed forces had been introduced into "hostilities."7
Such a report would have required the withdrawal of U.S. troops after sixty days unless
Congress had expressly approved their deployment!
Indeed, President Clinton failed to seek congressional approval of, or even to consult
meaningfully with Congress about, the U.S. response to the developing crisis. Congress
reacted with a plethora of conflicting legislative initiatives. For example, on the day before
NATO air strikes began, the Senate voted to authorize U.S. air operations and missile
strikes in cooperation with NATO allies." But on April 28, the House rejected the measure
on a tie vote of 213-213. Also on April 28, the House passed one of several proposals to
2. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/i199 (1998), available at <http://
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm>. The September resolution echoed Security Council Resolution
1160 of March 31, 1998, which called upon Belgrade and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to enter "into
a meaningful dialogue on political status issues" and that imposed an embargo on arms shipments to the area.
S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 160 (1998), available at <http://www.un.org/
peace/kosovo/98sc I 160.htm>.
3. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998), available at <http://www.
un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1 203.htm>.
4. SeeJavier Solana, NATO Press Release (Mar. 23, 1999), available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/
p99-040e.htm>.
5. Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 527 (Mar. 26, 1999), available at <http:/I
www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/29/ .text. I>.
6. Exec. Order 13,119, 64 Fed. Reg. 18,797 (1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/
uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/4/14/1.text.l>.
7. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1999).
8. See id. § 1544(b).
9. See S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999).
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prohibit the use of Department of Defense (DOD) funds for deployment of ground forces
in Yugoslavia without specific authorization by Congress.1o Other House resolutions in
April to remove all U.S. forces from Yugoslavia," to declare war on Yugoslavia,"2 and to
invoke section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to order a troop withdrawal"s were all
defeated by wide margins. A bill sponsored by Senator John McCain would, in terms rem-
iniscent of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, have empowered the president to "use all
necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United
States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia."' 4 It also failed. Finally, in May, both Houses approved a Supplemental Appro-
priations Act that expressly took note of U.S. participation in Operation Allied Force and
authorized funds to replace those used for "military operations in and around Kosovo.""5
The measure did not, however, specifically authorize U.S. involvement within the meaning
of section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.
Meanwhile, thirty-one members of Congress filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that the president's unilateral actions in Yugoslavia were unlawful under both the Decla-
ration Clause of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. In Campbell v. Clinton,'6
the court "expressed great reluctance to intercede in disputes between the political branches
of government that involve matters of war and peace"" and concluded that the plaintiffs'
alleged injuries were not sufficiently concrete and particularized to establish standing
to sue.
On April 30, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13,121,18 invoking the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act 9 to block Yugoslav government assets and bar all
unlicensed trading with Yugoslavia.
While the air campaign continued, NATO forces built refugee camps and emergency
feeding centers in Macedonia and Albania. They also assisted the U.N. High Commission
for Refugees (UNHCR) and private relief organizations with the transport and distribution
of food, equipment, and medical supplies.
On June 10, the air campaign was suspended following agreement to a full withdrawal
of Serbian forces from Kosovo. On the same day, the U.N. Security Council adopted Res-
olution 1244,0 authorizing the deployment of international security forces in Kosovo
(KFOR) in order to, inter alia, deter further violence and enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), establish a secure environment for the return of ref-
ugees and displaced persons to their homes, and supervise de-mining. It also approved the
10. H.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999).
11. H.R. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).
12. H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999).
13. H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999).
14. SJ. Res. 20, 106th Cong. (1999).
15. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 106-31, § 501(d), 113 Stat. 57, 77 (1999).
16. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (1999), affid, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
17. Id. at 40. The court of appeals went even further, declaring broadly that "congressmen maynot challenge
the President's war-making powers in federal court." Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
18. Exec. Order No. 13,121,64 Fed. Reg. 240,215 (1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
resfI2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/5/4/8.text. 1 >.
19. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1999).
20. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), available at <http:/!
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc 1244.htm>.
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establishment of a transitional civilian administration "under which the people of
Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," while
"[flacilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into
account the Rambouillet accords. '21
KFOR was well established in Kosovo by June 20. It eventually included some 50,000
personnel under unified command, including U.S. ground forces and a large contingent
from the Russian Federation.
For the remainder of 1999, Congress did not explicitly restrict or approve expenditures
for deployment of U.S. forces in and around Yugoslavia. It did, however, waive certain
limits on funding of NATO headquarters if needed to support "NATO forces in and around
former Yugoslavia."22 And in the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act, Congress called for
an extremely detailed report on U.S. involvement in Operation Allied Force, including
descriptions of U.S. national security interests at stake, political and military objectives of
the campaign, and decisions concerning the use of ground forces and assorted military
hardware.23
In the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign, the People's Republic of China agreed
to accept, and the United States agreed to pay, a settlement of $4.5 million for deaths and
injuries suffered in the destruction of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999.24
A U.S. official insisted that the payment was voluntary and not an admission of American
liability. Separately, the United States agreed to pay $28 million for damages to the Embassy
itself, but this payment will be reduced by $2.87 million for damage to the American Em-
bassy in Beijing during anti-American demonstrations that followed the bombing in
Yugoslavia.2"
B. TARGETING CIVILIANS
Motivated in part by the Kosovo conflict, the U.N. Security Council adopted two res-
olutions expressing condemnation for the targeting of children in situations of armed con-
flict and attacks on protected sites such as schools and hospitals. In Resolution 1261, the
Security Council urged adoption of special measures in armed conflicts "to protect children,
in particular girls, from rape and other forms of sexual abuse and gender-based violence in
situations of armed conflict" and "to intensify their efforts to ensure an end to the recruit-
ment and use of children in armed conflict." 26 In Resolution 1265, the Security Council
called upon states "to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes
against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law" and noted "that
the excessive accumulation and destabilizing effect of small arms and light weapons ... have
a potential to exacerbate and prolong conflicts, endanger the lives of civilians and undermine
security... "27
21. Id.
22. Appropriations, 2000-Department of Defense, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8045, 113 Stat. 1212, 1240
(1999).
23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No 106-65, § 1211, 113 Stat. 512,
782-84 (1999).
24. See Seth Faison, U.S. to Pay Cbinafr Embassy Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1999, at A5.
25. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.S. Agrees to Pay China $28 Million for Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999,
at A6.
26. S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. SCOR, 4037th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (1999).
27. S.C. Res. 1265, U.N. SCOR, 4046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (1999).
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II. Weapons Control
Overall, weapons control slid down the national security agenda. No new major initiatives
were successfully undertaken, one treaty was crippled, perhaps grievously, and challenges
to another escalated. In April, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was merged
into the State Department in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring
Act of 1998.28 The mission of arms control will be overseen by an Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security, who will also serve as Senior Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State on arms control.
A. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The year 1999 was disappointing for efforts to control nuclear weapons. Already agreed
to reductions of nuclear weapons proceeded ahead of schedule as the DOD imploded the
first of 150 Minuteman M ballistic missile silos in North Dakota in order to comply with
START I provisions.2 9 At the Clinton/Yeltsin Summit in June in Cologne, the two leaders
announced that both governments would do everything in their power to facilitate START
II ratification, and they agreed to begin discussions on START m and the ABM Treaty in
late summer. The first such meeting was held in August. In addition, they agreed on a new
initiative for exchanging early warning information on missile launches in order to reduce
the danger of inadvertent launches in response to false warnings of attack.3" But at year's
end there was no progress on Russian ratification of START II.
At the NATO Summit, held in Washington in April, the member states took two sig-
nificant weapons control steps.3 First, they recognized that international arms control and
disarmament arrangements contribute to Alliance security and that Alliance members
should cooperate to further advance those arrangements. Second, they acknowledged the
diminished salience of nuclear weapons and agreed that the Alliance would consider options
for confidence and security building measures, verification, nonproliferation, arms control,
and disarmament. Yet the Alliance reiterated the need to maintain nuclear weapons for the
foreseeable future on grounds that they contribute uniquely to "rendering the risks of
aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable."32 Proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WVMD) remains a serious challenge, as does the threat of operations
designed to exploit NATO's growing reliance on information systems. Notably, Germany's
request that NATO members lower the alert status of nuclear weapons and adopt a policy
of no-first-use of such weapons did not progress.
Certainly the most important event in nuclear weapons control was the Senate's refusal
to consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." Voting largely along
28. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6501-17 (1999).
29. See ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1999, at 29. See generally Andrew Duncan, START Cuts Begin To Make
Their Mark, JAE'S INTELLIGENCE REvIEW, Feb. 1, 1999, at 15.
30. See Yeltsin, Clinton Sign Joint Statement in Cologne, ITAR TAss, June 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL
21030453.
31. See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, Apr. 24, 1999, available at <http:/I
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>; see also NATO-The Alliance's Strategic Concept, M2 PRESSWIRE,
Apr. 26, 1999.
32. Id.
33. See Eric Schmitt, Defeat of a Treaty: The Overview; Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Lossfor Clinton;
Evokes Versailles Pact Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999.
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party lines, the fifty-one to forty-eight rejection was the first defeat of a major international
security agreement since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Despite the vote against ratifi-
cation, U.S. policy remains firmly against conducting nuclear tests. President Clinton an-
nounced that the United States would continue the testing moratorium it has observed
since 1992.14 Moreover, the United States continues to send a representative to Preparatory
Commission meetings of the Comprehensive Test Ban Organization as an observer.
In Moscow in October, Secretary of Energy Richardson and Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy Adamov signed the Agreement Regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear
Materials Physical Protection, Control and Accounting.3 5 The agreement is intended to
reduce threats posed by the proliferation of unsecured Russian weapons-usable nuclear
materials. It will reduce the number of sites that store such materials. It will also improve
security at remaining land- and ship-based sites storing highly enriched uranium fuels, at
the ten "closed nuclear cities" containing hundreds of tons of weapons-usable materials, at
eight large fuel facilities, and at twelve research reactor sites.3 6 The program will be funded
at $150 million in FY 2000.
Despite this new initiative, Congress imposed significant restrictions on expenditures in
Russia under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, including elimination of funding
for destruction of chemical weapons, elimination of conventional weapons, and environ-
mental restoration. Reporting requirements were also enacted that may slow reductions in
Russian strategic weapons. 7 The same measure forbade expenditures for reductions in U.S.
strategic bombers, submarines, and missiles below specified levels until the START II
Treaty, currently awaiting approval by the Russian Duma, enters into force.38
B. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
Foreshadowing a debate that is likely to dominate national security affairs in 2000, ad-
vocates for and against a national missile defense (NMD) clarified their positions in 1999
and defined the terms of the next decision. DOD began the year by proposing to increase
funding for NMD programs by $6.6 billion through FY 2005, for a total of $10.5 billion.
For FY 2000, the Administration requested a total of $4.2 billion, including $1.3 billion
for strategic missile defense, $612 million for Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD), $410 million on PAC-3, and $350 million on the Navy Theater Wide defense. 39
Later in the spring, Congress approved the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, de-
claring that it is U.S. policy to: (1) deploy as soon as technologically possible a NMD system
capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack; and (2) seek
continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. The vote was 345 to seventy-
34. See Despite Test-Ban Reection, Commitment to Arms Control "Unwavering," United States Tells Committee,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 21, 1999.
35. See Partnership for Nuclear Security, Breaking News: The Agreement Between the United States and the
Russian Federation on Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Is Signed!, available at <http://
www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/oldnews/09-10_-99.htm>.
36. See THE MONITOR, Fall 1999/Winter 2000, at 32.
37. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, §§ 1301-1312, 113
Stat. 512, 792-96 (1999).
38. Id. § 1501, 113 Stat. at 806.
39. See <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Janl999/bO1201999_-btO18-99.html>; see also David A. Fulghum
& Robert Wall, Pentagon Budget Up, But Research Withers, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 8, 1999, at 28.
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one in the House and ninety to three in the Senate.40 Despite having opposed similar
legislation in 1998, President Clinton signed the measure into law.4 1 Moreover, the presi-
dent affirmed that he would decide in 2000 whether to deploy a limited NMD system, to
reject deployment, or to postpone the decision. His decision would be based on an assess-
ment of four factors: (1) whether the threat of missiles launched from rogue states is ma-
terializing; (2) the status of the technology, based on an initial series of flight tests; (3) the
system's affordability; and (4) the implications of going forward for the overall strategic
environment and for U.S. arms control objectives, including efforts to further reduce nu-
clear weapons under START I and IH.42
Ironically, at the Cologne Summit in June, the United States and Russia reaffirmed their
commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, calling it the "cornerstone of the
strategic stability.' '45 Nevertheless, both parties affirmed their obligations to consider
changes in the strategic situation that bear on the ABM Treaty and proposals for increasing
the Treaty's viability.44
C. PROLIFERATION
Following the damage to nonproliferation efforts by Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests
in 1998, 1999 was a relatively benign year. The most significant event was the U.N. Security
Council's establishment in December, by a vote of eleven for to four abstaining,45 of a new
commission to verify Iraqi compliance with its weapons control obligations-the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Since the
expulsion of inspectors from Iraq in December 1998, there had been no U.N. monitoring
of Iraq's VWMD activities. Under the terms of the resolution, UNMOVIC and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must draw up a work program within two months
of starting their work in Iraq, including a list of the key questions that remain to be an-
swered. Four months later, the inspectors must tell the Security Council whether Iraq has
cooperated with it in all respects and has shown progress toward answering the questions.
If it has, the Security Council could consider suspending economic sanctions against Iraq
for an initial period of 120 days, subject to renewal if the Council so votes. The resolution
effectively ends the embargo on Iraqi oil exports regardless of whether Saddam Hussein
cooperates with the inspection regime or not. It also relaxes some controls on Iraq's import
of medical, agricultural, and educational supplies, although sanctions, including a ban on
international flights except for pilgrimages to Mecca, remain in place. The resolution calls
for appointment of a chairman (Hans Blix was appointed in January 2000), as well as crea-
tion of a "College of Commissioners" to review the work of the new monitoring system.-
Other multilateral initiatives were less momentous. In May, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) created an Implementation Working Group, chaired by the United Kingdom, to
40. See Elizabeth Becker, Congress Passes Antimissile Defense Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999.
41. National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-38, 113 Stat. 205 (1999).
42. See Barry Kellman, National Missile Defense in the Context of Multilateral, Multifaceted Security, 4 NExus
73 (1999).
43. Yeltsin, Clinton Sign Joint Statement in Cologne, ITAR TAss, June 20, 1999.
44. See id.
45. See S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999), available at <http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1284.htm>. Among the four abstentions were three permanent members:
China, France, and Russia.
46. Id.
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consider changes to guidelines, membership rules, and controls on brokering. The Working
Group will prepare a report on NSG activities for the 2000 NPT Conference . 7 At the
same time, the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference held its third
session and reached an agreement on implementation of IAEA safeguards and peaceful uses
of nuclear energy but not on nuclear disarmament issues 8.4 In an unrelated development, a
Department of State team of experts visited the underground facility at Kumchang-ni,
North Korea, and concluded that the site does not violate the U.S.-Democratic People's
Republic of Korea agreed framework. 4
9
Domestic anti-proliferation initiatives were few and notable only for their demonstration
of slow or even stalled progress. In July, the Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the
Deutch Commission) asserted that the United States is ill-prepared to combat the prolif-
eration of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and recommended a single budget
and several agency changes to address the threats0 In November, President Clinton ex-
tended a national emergency, first declared in 1994, with respect to the "unusual and ex-
traordinary threat" posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."
D. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL
The Chemical Weapons Convention's complex verification program proceeded without
major incident. As of the end of 1999, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) had completed over 500 inspections and overseen the destruction of
more than 3,000 metric tons of chemical agents. 2 In the United States, President Clinton
issued an executive order" in June to facilitate compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act.s4 By year's end, nearly 170 inspections had been con-
ducted at military facilities in the United States.5"
Efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention effectively stalled. The Ad
Hoc Group of States Parties held five sessions to try to negotiate a compliance protocol to
the convention without reaching a formal consensus.50 U.S. representatives objected to a
47. See Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 35 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 2331 (Nov. 10, 1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov>.
48. See ThE MoNIToR, Fall 1999/Winter 2000, at 3.
49. See Message to the Congress, supra note 47.
50. See <http://www.senate.gov-specter/l 191Obook.pdf>.
51. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Notice: Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction (Nov. 10, 1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2 R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.
gov.us/1999/l 11/12/19.textl >. The emergency was initially declared in Executive Order 12,938, 59 Fed. Reg.
58,099 (1994), on November 14, 1994.
52. See Despite Test-Ban Rejection, supra note 34. The OPCW was established by the Chemical Weapons
Convention. As of late 1999, the Convention had 126 states parties.
53. Exec. Order No. 13,128, 64 Fed. Reg. 34,703 (1999),availableat <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/I2R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/6/ 28/4.text.2>.
54. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701-71 (1999). See generally Barry
Kellman, The Advent of International Chemical Regulation: The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,
25J. LEG. 117 (1999).
55. See Message to the Congress, supra note 47.
56. See Draft Text on Biological Weapons Convention Introduced in Disarmament Committee, U.N. Press Release
GA/DIS/3151, Oct. 22, 1999, available at <http://www.un.org>.
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proposed inspection regime out of concerns that international inspections at pharmaceutical
and other medical facilities might imperil commercial secrets or compromise national
security."
E. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONTROL
At the first meeting of the states parties to the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty" in Mo-
zambique, on May 3-7, it was reported that 135 states had signed the treaty and seventy-
eight had ratified it.59 The treaty entered into force on March 1. The United States still
refuses to sign, although President Clinton has indicated that the United States will sign
by 2006 if the Pentagon comes up with an alternative weapon. He has also pledged that
the United States will unilaterally halt its use of such mines everywhere except in Korea by
2003, and altogether by 2006.60 Notably, from 1996, when the Ottawa process began,
through 1999, more than fourteen million stockpiled mines have been destroyed. Never-
theless, anti-personnel landmines were used extensively in Kosovo and Angola last year.
6
'
Although the United States remains outside the new treaty regime, in May the Senate
approved the 1996 amended landmines protocol (Protocol H) to the Convention on Con-
ventional Weapons, expanding the scope of the original protocol to include internal con-
flicts. 62 The new protocol seeks to reinforce the original treaty's restrictions on the use,
production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines by states parties. It prohibits the use
of nondetectable mines, mines that are detonated by the presence of mine detectors, and
mines equipped with anti-handling devices that operate after the mine deactivates. The
amended protocol also severely restricts the use of remotely delivered mines, and prohibits
the use of non-self-destructing mines and non-self-deactivating mines unless planted in
monitored and marked areas. 63
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published Arms Availability and
the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict, showing that the continued availability of arms,
even after periods of conflict, undermines the rule of law and hampers efforts at reconcil-
iation among former warring parties. According to the report, international arms transfers
have become easier, outpacing efforts to ensure compliance with the basic rules of warfare.
The ICRC called upon states to review their policies concerning the production, availability,
and transfer of arms and ammunition. 6-
57. See Ronald Atlas, Combating the Threat of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism: DefendingAgainst Biological Weapons
Is Critical to Global Security, BIOSCIENCE, June 1, 1999, at 465.
58. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507.
59. See First Meeting of States Parties to Convention on Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Opens in Maputo,
U.N. Press Release DC/2642, May 3, 1999, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19990503.DC2642.html>.
60. See Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Agrees to Land-Mine Ban, But Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1998, at A3.
61. See Despite Test-Ban Rejection, supra note 34 (statement of Christopher Westdal (Canada)).
62. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: Protocol on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), 145 CONo. REc. S5780-02,
S5780 (daily ed. May 20, 1999).
63. See Wade Boese, U.S. RatifiesAmended CCWLandmines Protocol, Ams CocrRoL ToDAv, Apr./May 1999,
at 44.
64. See Despite Test-Ban Rejection, Commitment to Arms Control "Unwavering," United States Tells Committee,
M2 PREsswIRE, Oct. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 24363719 (Statement of Sylvie Junod (ICRC)).
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MI. Terrorism
Terrorism rose to the top of the international security agenda. Attacks on targets in Israel
and Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas were intended to impede peace
efforts in the Middle East. Toward the end of 1999, several terrorist activities were appar-
ently related to observance of the millennium. Jordanian police arrested members of a cell-
linked to Usama bin Laden-that was said to be planning attacks on Western tourists.6s U.S.
Customs agents arrested an Algerian national smuggling almost fifty pounds of explosive
materials and detonating devices into the United States, as well as other Algerians also
reportedly linked to bin Laden.6 6 And hijackers linked to Pakistani terrorists held some 150
passengers hostage and killed one person on an Indian Airlines jet.6 Inside Russia, five
explosions in Moscow claimed nearly 300 lives and contributed to that nation's decision to
escalate the fighting in Chechnya.
No major international treaties on terrorism were finalized in 1999. At year's end, the
U.N. General Assembly accepted the recommendation of its Sixth Committee by adopting
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and calling
upon all states to enact domestic legislation to ensure that perpetrators of terrorism can be
brought to justice. 6 The proposed Convention on Nuclear Terrorism stalled over disagree-
ments about how to phrase obligations to secure nuclear materials.69 The most important
initiative was Security Council Resolution 1269, 70 calling upon states to take appropriate
steps to cooperate in preventing terrorist acts and bringing terrorists to justice. The reso-
lution also calls for concerted action against those who finance terrorist groups, for ex-
changes of information, and for cooperation on administrative and judicial matters to pre-
vent terrorism.
Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan, State Department Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,
indicated that the primary area of U.S. concern for terrorism is Southwest Asia, specifically
Afghanistan and Iran.7 Afghanistan's provision of sanctuary for active terrorists explains
the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267,72 imposing international sanctions
on the Taliban until they turn over Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought
to justice. Iran poses a different problem: according to CIA Director George Tenet, it
"remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism.""
The State Department designated twenty-eight groups as Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
65. SeeJordan Arrests 13 Terror Suspects, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIGEST, Dec. 23, 1999, at 932.
66. See Lorraine Adams & David A. Vise, Border Arrests Yield Little Calm, WASH. POsT,Jan. 10, 2000, at A3.
67. See Celia Dugger, Hostages Recall Times of Terror Amid Boredom, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 2, 2000, at 1.
68. See Assembly Adopts Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Financing; Text to Open for Signature on 10
January, U.N. Press Release GA/9683 (1999), available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/
19991209.ga9683.doc.html>.
69. Id.
70. S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 4053rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999), available at <http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/ 1999/99sc l269.htn>.
71. See Michael A. Sheehan, Post-Millennium Terrorism Review (2000), available at <http://wwwstate.gov/
www/policy-remarks/2000/00210_sheehanbrooking.html>.
72. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 4051st intg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999), available at <http:/
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99scl 267.htm>.
73. See James Risen, C.IA. Director Emphasizes Differences in Security Cases of Ev-Cbief and Scientist, N.Y.
TMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at A.
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tions, including, for the first time, AI-Qaida, which is led by Usama bin Laden.74 Pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),75 President Clinton signed
Executive Order 13,099 on August 20, prohibiting transactions with bin Laden and other
suspected terrorists said to threaten disruption of the Middle East peace process. 6
On the domestic front, President Clinton declared in January that defending the nation
against terrorist threats is a top national security priority.77 He proposed increased federal
support for training and material assistance to local communities to respond to chemical
or biological attacks, as well as new federal programs to protect critical infrastructure from
cyber attacks.
In line with the president's proposals, new bureaucratic institutions and new missions for
existing institutions were announced to strengthen counterterrorism. The National Do-
mestic Preparedness Office, with participants from FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and
the FBI, is designed to serve as a clearinghouse to provide information to state and local
governments and to establish standards for the execution of federal programs pertaining to
terrorist uses of WMD.10 The Pentagon announced the creation of a new Joint Task Force
for Civil Support to be headed by a two-star general that will coordinate military actions
if an enemy targets the United States with weapons of mass destruction.79 A civilian agency
still unnamed will, however, have overall direction of consequence management.
Perhaps the most important legislative initiative concerning terrorism is Congress' ap-
proval in the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act of military assistance to civil authorities
to respond to acts or threats of terrorism involving a WMD within the United States. 0
The Secretary of Defense, upon the request of the Attorney General, may furnish DOD
personnel and resources "to the extent and for such period as the Secretary of Defense
determines necessary to prepare for, prevent, or respond to an act or threat of an act of
terrorism...."' Whether and to what extent this sweeping language effects a waiver of the
Posse Comitatus Act's prohibition on the use of military forces for law enforcement", re-
mains unclear. Another important measure introduced in the Senate was the 21st Century
Justice Act of 1999,93 which would, inter alia, prohibit unlicensed possession of biological
pathogens and would expand jurisdiction over any foreign person or financial institution
that commits a prohibited financial transaction in support of terrorism.
One measure of the importance of the terrorism issue is the number of commissions
devoted in whole or in part to analyzing this threat and recommending measures to combat
74. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Designation by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright (Oct. 8, 1999),
available at http://www.state.gov/www/globa1/terrorism/fto_1999.html>.
75. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1999).
76. Exec. Order No. 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/8/24/2 .text.2>.
77. See Remarks by the President on Keeping America Secure for the 21st Century (Jan. 22, 1999), available at
<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2 R?urn:pdi://oma.eop. gov.us/1999/l/22/9.text. 1>; see also Presi-
dent Clinton's Initiative on Biological and Chemical Weapons Preparedness, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 25, 1999, available
in 1999 WL 7550554.
78. See <http://www.fbi.gov/programs/ndpo/default.htm>.
79. See Jim Garamone, Unified Command Plan Changes Announced (last modified Oct. 7, 1999) <http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/n10071999_9910076.html>.
80. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1023, 113 Stat. 512,
747-48 (1999).
81. Id. § 1023(b), 113 Stat. at 747.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1999).
83. S. 899, 106th Cong. (1999).
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it. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) was established to assess capabilities
for responding to terrorist incidents in the U.S. homeland involving WMD. s4 The National
Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) was set up to make recommendations for
preventing and punishing acts of terrorism."
A separate federal advisory commission, headed by former Senators Hart and Rudman,
warned that the United States and its citizens at home and abroad are vulnerable to threats
from terrorists and rogue states."6 The most serious threat may be from "unannounced
attacks on American cities" by terrorist groups using germ warfare, the report said.s7 An-
other could be a cyber attack on the air traffic control system of the east coast "as some
200 commercial aircraft are trying to land safely in a morning's rain and fog." 8 It also
suggested that lack of preparation for terrorist threats at home will create increased pressure
on the military to expand its scope into domestic law enforcement.
A significant legal development was the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Rahman.s9 The decision affirmed the conviction of Sheik Rahman and members of the Al-
Gama'a AI-Islamiyya for their roles in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in
New York, the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the assassi-
nation of Rabbi Meir Kuhane, and the attempted bombings of the Holland and Lincoln
Tunnels in New York. Rahman and his co-defendants were convicted of seditious conspir-
acy9° and other offenses for their roles in "a wide ranging plot to conduct a campaign of
urban terrorism." 91 The court rejected Rahman's arguments that his conviction was based
merely on his religious beliefs and protected expression, and that it therefore violated con-
stitutional protections in the First Amendment.
In another case, a district court judge trying five defendants accused in the bombings of
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania ruled that defense lawyers must obtain security
clearances before reviewing classified documents relevant to the case. 92 This requirement
will not, the court declared, violate the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
Yet another decision having potentially major implications for the war against terrorism
was Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.9 There, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Scalia, decided that under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 94 federal courts lack jurisdiction to intervene in the
84. The Commission was established in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261, § 1405, 112 Stat. 1920, 2169 (1998).
85. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-27, § 591, 111 Stat. 244, 247 (1998).
86. See United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming:American Security
in the 21st Century (Sept. 15, 1999), available at <http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/NewWorld-Coming/
newworldcoming.htm>.
87. Id. at <htp://www.nssg/gov/Reports/New-World-Coming/new-world-coming8.htm>.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 830 (2000).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1999).
91. Rahman, 189 F.3d at 103.
92. United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see Benjamin Weiser, Security Checks
Required of Terror Suspects' Lawyers, N.Y. TiMEs, July 1, 1999, at A 17.
93. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm'n., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
94. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-546 (1996).
VOL. 34, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 811
Attorney General's decision to commence deportation proceedings against a resident alien
in advance of a final order of deportation. The aliens in that case were targeted for depor-
tation because of their association with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PLFP), a Syria-based group linked to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that
is known to be a sponsor of international terrorism. Brushing aside complaints that the
Attorney General's actions violated the aliens' First Amendment associational rights, the
Court indicated that such cases risk
the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products
and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for deeming
nationals of a particular country a special threat ... and even if it did disclose them a court
would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their
adequacy."
IV. Cyber Warfare
Perhaps future analysts will look back on 1999 as the year that military capacities of cyber
systems rose to prominence on the national security agenda. One reason was that the num-
ber of disruptive cyber attacks against DOD's information networks more than tripled, from
5,844 cases in 1998 to 18,433 as of November 1999 (there were only 250 reported attacks
in 1994). 96 Most of these attacks were by hackers, yet some were highly sophisticated in-
trusions that may have been directed by foreign intelligence services. One sustained and
coordinated intrusion early in the year is believed to have been launched from systems in
Russia, although no evidence is available indicating Russian government involvement in the
attack.97
As the unrivaled leader in cyber technology, of course, the United States is both the most
vulnerable to cyber attack and the most capable of exploiting that technology for military
purposes. Accordingly, the United States undertook several important defensive cyber ini-
tiatives in 1999. It also clarified the role that cyber capabilities may have in the U.S.'s
projection of force in the future.
In July, the White House announced a plan to protect critical U.S. information systems
from attacks by hostile nations or organized crime, along with a request for $1.4 billion for
national cyber defenses in FY 2000.91 The plan relies on the public and private sectors to
develop their own safeguards and to exchange information about security breaches. By 2003,
government agencies and private concerns should establish systems to detect and deflect
attacks by the deployment of firewalls, intrusion detection monitors, enterprise-wide man-
agement systems, and malicious-code scanners. They are also expected to share warnings,
design systems to respond to information emergencies, and enhance research and devel-
opment. 99 During this period, law enforcement capabilities will be developed to investigate
and prosecute cyber attacks. 100
95. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, 525 U.S. at 491.
96. See Cyber Attacks Against DOD Up 300 Percent This Year (last modified Nov. 8, 1999) <http://
www.infowar.com/milc4i/99/mil-c4i-l 10899a.j.shtml>.
97. See id.
98. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Senate Special Year 2000 Technology Problem Y2K
Information Center, July 29, 1999 (statement of Richard C. Shaeffer).
99. See Ann Harrison, Gov't Official Outlines Cyberdefense Plan, COMPurERWORLDJuly 9, 1999.
100. See Robert Lemos, U.S. Vulnerable to Cyber Attack, ZDNE-r AuSTRALtA, July 8, 1999, available at <http://
www.zdnet.com.au/>.
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President Clinton also signed an executive order'5 ' creating the National Infrastructure
Assurance Council (NIAC), to include thirty members from federal, state, and local gov-
ernments, as well as from the private sector.' °2 The NIAC is supposed to encourage the
industry to perform risk assessments, and it will monitor development of information shar-
ing centers.
The General Services Administration worked to develop a new system, called "Fidnet,"
to protect civilian agencies, including the State Department, from computer hackers.103 It
would augment the existing National Infrastructure Protections Center, located in FBI
headquarters, and a similar Pentagon program called Joint Task Force on Computer Net-
work Defense.' 4 According to Richard A. Clarke, National Coordinator for Security, In-
frastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, Fidnet could help protect the nation from
an "electronic Pearl Harbor." Some congressional Republicans and civil libertarians, how-
ever, expressed concern that the new system might allow government monitoring of in-
nocent citizens.
On October 7, the Pentagon announced establishment of a new center for cyber warfare
in Colorado Springs, both to defend against hackers and to develop ways to attack an
enemy's computer network. 105 Government officials also acknowledged that the United
States had mounted attacks on Serbian computer networks during the aerial campaign over
Kosovo and on foreign bank accounts belonging to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosovic
and other Serbian leaders. In future wars, the new center would try to disable enemy air
defense systems and disrupt other operations.
The application of international law to cyber warfare was discussed in detail in a report
prepared by DOD's Office of General Counsel."16 According to the report, there is no
categorical prohibition against the cyber warfare capabilities currently contemplated by the
Pentagon. Yet the ban on indiscriminate use of weapons might apply if the consequence of
a cyber attack was to cause significant civilian casualties by damaging critical infrastructure.
Even without such damage, a nation under cyber attack would be entitled to respond in
self-defense, either by attacking an enemy's computer network or by using force to disable
the equipment and personnel that mounted the attack. The report asserts that the United
States has not yet fully assessed its long-term interests in possible international legal re-
strictions on information operations. Such operations could minimize both collateral dam-
age and losses of personnel and equipment. On the other hand, as the nation that relies
101. Exec. Order No. 13,130, 64 Fed. Reg. 38,535 (1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/7/15/ lO.text.2>.
102. See Christopher J. Dorobek, Clinton Creates Council to Protect Nation's Critical Infrastructure, GOVERN-
MENT CoMPTrrER NEWS, Aug. 30, 1999.
103. See Tim Weiner, Author of Computer Surveillance Plan Tries to Ease Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999,
at A14.
104. See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Task Force on Computer Network Defense Now
Operational, Office of Asst. Secretary of Defense (last modified Dec. 30, 1998) <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/
usdefense/Defenselinkl 23098.html>.
105. See Elizabeth Becker, Pentagon Sets Up New Center for Waging Cyberwarfare, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 8,1999,
at A16.
106. See Office of General Council, Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in
Information Operations (May 1999), available at <http://www.infowar.com/info-ops/info-ops-061599a-j.s.html>;
see also John Markoff, Cyberwafare Breaks the Rules of Military Engagement, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 17, 1999, at § 4,
p. 5, available at <http://www.infowar.com/info-ops/info-ops_061599a-j.shtml>.
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most heavily on advanced information systems, the United States is most vulnerable to
attack.
V. Authorization for United States Military Activities
Abroad
At its April Summit meeting in Washington, D.C., NATO adopted a new "Strategic
Concept.""'1 It includes, inter alia, a commitment to act in the common defense as well as
to "seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis
arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including
through the possibility of conducting non-article 5 crisis response operations."'' l0 This lan-
guage is supposed to permit NATO involvement in crises like Kosovo, outside the borders
of member states. Omitted from the new document is a 1991 policy declaration that "[t]he
Alliance is purely defensive in purpose... ."19 In its FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act,
Congress directed the president to certify whether the Strategic Concept imposes any new
commitment or obligation on the United States, and, if so, to submit it as a treaty for the
Senate's advice and consent."l0 President Clinton indicated in his signing statement that the
Strategic Concept is a "political, not a legal, document," and that it creates no new com-
mitment or obligation."'
Congress also amended the IEEPA112 by providing that "upon the use of Armed Forces
of the United States to engage in hostilities against any foreign country, the President shall,
as appropriate (1) seek the establishment of a multinational economic embargo against such
country; and (2) seek the seizure of its foreign financial assets.""'3 There is no indication in
the legislation that the "hostilities" must have been approved by Congress.
Throughout the year, sometimes on a daily basis, U.S. and British forces carried out air
strikes against Iraqi radar sites and missile launchers that threatened their aircraft patrolling
the northern and southern no-flight zones established at the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf
War.' The United States justified the attacks as acts of self-defense.
On September 16, the White House announced that the United States would send 200
troops to join an Australian-led multinational force that moved into East Timor to restore
order there."l 5 The American troops were not responsible for combat, but for planning,
107. See The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Press Release NAC-S(99)65 (Apr. 24, 1999), available at <http://
www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.
108. Id.
109. Jane Perlez, Crisis in the Balkans: NATO; NATO Confronts a New Role: Regional Policeman, N.Y. TMES,
Apr. 22, 1999, at Al.
110. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1221, 113 Stat.
at 786 (1999).
111. Statement by the President (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://
oma.eop.gov.us/1999/10/6/2 .text. 1.21>.
112. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1999).
113. Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1231, 113 Stat. at 788 (adding 50 U.S.C. § 1707).
114. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth, U.S. Jets Attack Missile Sites in Southern Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999;
Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S. Strikes Twice (last modified Jan. 14,1999) <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/
n01141999_9901146.html>.
115. Statement by the President (last modified Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/9/16/l I.textl>; see also Letter to Congressional Leaders on Deployment of
United States Force to Provide Support to the Multinational Force in East Timor, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1998 (Oct. 8, 1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?um:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/-
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communications, intelligence, transportation, and logistics. Six weeks later, on October 25,
the U.N. Security Council approved the deployment of a follow-on U.N. force to take over
the former Indonesian territory and administer it until it is strong and stable enough to
become fully independent.'6 That force, called United Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET), includes 9,150 military peacekeepers and observers, 1,640 po-
lice officers, and hundreds of civilian administrators and aid workers.
Congress cut off funds for the deployment of U.S. military forces in Haiti after May 3 1,
2000."1 Troops were first deployed there in 1994 pursuant to Operation Uphold Democ-
racy. More recently, the DOD announced that all remaining personnel in Haiti would be
withdrawn by April 15, 2000.1 s
In September, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13,139,119 outlining procedures
for presidential waivers of informed consent for the use in combat operations of drugs and
vaccines that have not yet been approved by the FDA. The issue arose in connection with
the ongoing, but very controversial, vaccination of U.S. military personnel against anthrax.
VI. Information Security
There is tension, perhaps inevitably, between the need to maintain the confidentiality of
information relevant to national security and the need to divulge information for purposes
of justice and informed discussion of issues. Closely related is the tension between the need
to collect information relevant to national security and concerns for individual privacy. In
1999, these tensions were manifest against a background of concern over the loss of infor-
mation about nuclear weapons to the People's Republic of China. Indeed, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence's Report on Impacts on U.S. National Security ofAdvanced Satellite
Technology Transfers to the People's Republic of China recommended close monitoring of Chi-
nese launches of U.S. satellites to prevent unauthorized technology transfers, greater open-
ness in export license decisions, and meaningful participation by the intelligence community
in those decisions12°
Concerned about the release of confidential information, Congress directed the president
to notify it of each "security or counterintelligence failure or compromise of classified
information at a facility of the Department of Energy ... likely to cause significant harm
or damage to the national security interests of the United States."' 2' Notice is also required
1999/10/12/3.text.l>; Elizabeth Becker, Clinton Is Sending 200 Troops ]br East Timor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1999, at A6. The multinational force was authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1264 on September
15, 1999. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1264 (1999), available at <http://
www.un.org/DOCSIScres/1999/99SC 1264.htm>.
116. See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999), available at <http://
www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/9931277E.htm>.
117. Notice to Congressional Committees of Certain Security and Counter Intelligence Failures Within
Nuclear Energy Defense Program, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1232, 113 Star. 512, 788 (1999).
118. See Linda D. Kozaryn, Haiti Mission Ends, AMERICAN FORCES PREss SERV., Feb. 29, 2000, available at
<http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/Marl 996/n03011996-9603013.html>.
119. Exec. Order No. 13,139,64 Fed. Reg. 54,175 (1999), available at <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-
res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/10/ 1/8.text.2>.
120. See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Press Release (May 5, 1999), available at <http:H
intelligence.senate.gov/990505.ho>.
121. Notice to Congressional Committees of Certain Security and Counter Intelligence Failures Within
Nuclear Energy Defense Programs, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 1042, 113 Stat. 512, 759-60 (1999) (adding 10
U.S.C. § 2723).
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of any "significant nuclear defense intelligence loss."' The president took strong exception
to these provisions as interfering with his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief
to protect classified information, and he indicated in his signing statement that he would
treat them as merely advisory.'23
The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 also created a new semiautonomous agency
within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration, to oversee nuclear weapons
programs.2 4 The president objected strongly to the creation of a redundant counterintel-
ligence office that he said would blur lines of authority within the Department and might
impair the secretary's ability to discharge his duties under the Atomic Energy Act. 2' Ac-
cordingly, the president announced in his signing statement that the secretary would be
assigned to perform all the statutory functions of the newly created Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, and he directed that other current Department personnel be assigned
wherever possible to perform concurrent duties under the new legislation. 2 More recently,
a panel of the House Armed Services Committee complained that the overlapping assign-
ments failed to follow Congress' mandate and would undermine the autonomy of the new
agency. 27
In the FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress called on the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence (DCI), the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), and the At-
torney General to submit to Congress within sixty days a detailed analysis of the "legal
standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals in-
telligence activities, including electronic surveillance." 12s The requirement followed a re-
port from the European Parliament on privacy concerns growing out of Echelon, the world-
wide surveillance network used by the NSA and several U.S. allies to intercept overseas
telephone calls, faxes, and e-mail. 12 9
Congress also called on the DCI to report to Congress within nine months describing
"all activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements in the intelligence
community" with respect to the assassination of Chilean President Salvador Allende in
1973, the accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the Presidency of Chile, and human
rights violations by Pinochet's officers and agents. 30 This directive came as documents
released pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request showed that the FBI
tried to track associates of Chilean leftists inside the United States on behalf of General
Pinochet in the 1970s."" A broad declassification review by the State Department and other
122. Id. § 3150, 113 Stat. at 939.
123. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (last modified Oct. 5,
1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-resI2R?urn:pdi://oma.cop.gov.us/1 999/1 0/6/2.text.l >.
124. Notice to Congressional Committees of Certain Security and Counter Intelligence Failures Within
Nuclear Energy Defense Programs, Pub. L. No. 106-65, §§ 3201-99, 113 Stat. 512, 953-71 (1999).
125. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1999).
126. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (last modified Oct. 5,
1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/l999/10/6/2.text.l>.
127. See Eric Schmitt, Panel Faults Energy Unit on Plan for NuclearAgency, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, at 7.
128. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 309, 113 Stat. 1606, 1613
(1999).
129. See Interception Capabilities 2000: Report to the Director General for Research of the European Parliament
(last modified April 1999) <http://www.iptvreports.incmail.com/interception capabilities-2000.htm>.
130. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 311, 113 Stat. at 1614
(1999).
131. See Tim Weiner, FBI Aided Search for Leftists, Files Show, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1999, at A6.
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agencies of records describing U.S. relations with the Chilean dictator led to the release of
5,800 documents showing that the U.S. government was well aware of widespread human
rights abuses by the Chilean military, including the killings and torture of leftist dissidents.
The records were sought by Spanish authorities seeking to extradite Pinochet from Great
Britain to face charges of crimes against humanity. 3
Two FOIA decisions in 1999 bear importantly on national security. Aftergood v. Central
Intelligence Agency'33 involved a request to view the total FY 1999 budget for all intelligence
and intelligence-related activities. Although the intelligence budget totals for the two pre-
vious fiscal years had been made public, the court, relying on one unclassified and two
classified affidavits from DCI Tenet, ruled that the FY 1999 figure could be withheld under
Exemption 1 because the affidavits "'simply contain[ed]' reasonable specificity'" and were
"not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency
bad faith."'134 With equal deference, the court decided that in order to invoke Exemption 3
"the CIA need only demonstrate that the information 'relates' to intelligence sources and
methods."'35
Campbell v. United States Department of Justice36 grew out of a request for records about
the author James Baldwin during what the court called "an awkward period in the history
of the FBI."' 37 A D.C. Circuit panel held that in applying Exemption 1, the Department
could rely on the relevant executive order in effect when the requested documents were
initially classified, rather than the superceding Clinton executive order, since the latter order
does not require an agency to reconsider classification decisions in pending FOIA litigation.
It also decided that the lower court should have not granted summary judgment for the
government based on an agency affidavit that, even under the lower standard of the Reagan
executive order, lacked sufficient detail and specificity.
132. See Philip Shenon, U.S. Releases Files on Abuses in Pinochet Era, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1999, at Al1.
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